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Floating on a Sea of Funny Money: An
Analysis of Money Laundering Through
Miami Real Estate and the Federal
Government’s Attempt to Stop it
Gary McPherson*
Miami is experiencing a money laundering controversy the likes
of which have not been seen since the “Cocaine Cowboys” era of
1980’s Miami. Condominiums and other mega developments are
popping up at an unprecedented pace, immediately after the
housing market crash that caused the Great Recession. Adding to
this questionable boom in development is the fact that the vast
majority of Miami’s population cannot afford to live in places like
these. So, the question presented is who is fueling this explosion
in development? Criminals, that’s who. Federal agents believe
criminals are buying coveted Miami real estate through shell
companies to launder their ill–gotten money.
In response to this crisis, the Department of the Treasury’s
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a
Geographic Targeting Order (GTO) that requires Miami title
insurers to report information about the identities of those hiding
behind shell companies to buy real estate in cash purchases.
Through the order, FinCEN aims to gain information about and
deter potential money launderers. The GTO places Miami
squarely in the cross–hairs of FinCEN’s anti–money laundering
regime. However, there is a problem: the GTO will not actually
prevent money laundering. There are fundamental issues with the
GTO: it is underinclusive and riddled with loopholes and
*
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ambiguities. These issues are easily resolved by a more inclusive,
detailed drafting of the GTO that eliminates the many loopholes
and clarifies the latent ambiguities inherent in it. However, as
currently written, the GTO’s many issues prevent it from
effectively fighting money laundering in Miami, but they also
shelter Miami’s real estate market from the potential negative
effects that many feared the GTO would cause.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Miami is in the midst of a housing crisis, the likes of which have not
been seen since the “Cocaine Cowboys” era of 1980’s Miami. Biscayne’s
wondrous shore is once again awash with “funny money” that is driving
the luxury real estate market.1 Condominiums and other mega
developments are rising at an unprecedented rate, immediately after the
nation’s worst housing crash in its history.2 The vast majority of Miami’s
population cannot even afford to live in places like these, adding more
suspicion to the already questionable boom in development.3 These
abnormalities raise a critical question: what is fueling this explosion of
development? Federal agents hypothesize that criminals are buying
precious Miami real estate, through the veil of shell companies, to launder
their ill–gotten money.4
If this story sounds familiar, that is because it is; Miami has a long
history of money laundering, dating back to the days of the “Cocaine
Cowboys.”5 While imported Colombian cocaine flooded the streets of
South Florida, drug traffickers and dealers laundered the proceeds of their
enterprises through Miami real estate.6 During this period in the 1980’s,
criminals laundered billions in ill–gotten gains through Miami banks and
real estate.7 This enormous influx of cash significantly shaped Miami’s
real estate industry and landscape.8 The beautiful skyline that Miami is
known for, “[c]ocaine was the currency that built that skyline.”9
The reemergence of large–scale money laundering in Miami is
partially a result of the real estate and banking industries’ laissez–faire
attitude toward acceptance of large sums of cash. Because Miami’s real
estate and banking industries “grew up in the [Cocaine Cowboys] era . . .
the attitude here has always been to make a quick deal and don’t ask any
1

See Nicholas Nehamas, How Secret Offshore Money Helps Fuel Miami’s Luxury
Real–Estate Boom, MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 3, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.miamiherald.
com/news/business/real-estate-news/article69248462.html#storylink=cpy.
2
See Brian Bandell, Cash, Condos & Criminals: The Big Loophole For Money
Laundering, S. FLA. BUS. J. (Aug. 30, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/
southflorida/print-edition/2013/08/30/llcs-offer-secrecy-to-foreign-criminal.html.
3
See Nehamas, supra note 1 (stating that “[m]oney from people linked to wrongdoing
abroad is helping to power the gleaming condo towers rising on South Florida’s waterfront
and pushing home prices far beyond what most locals can afford”).
4
See id.
5
See id.
6
See Ken Silverstein, Miami: Where Luxury Real Estate Meets Dirty Money, THE
NATION (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/miami-where-luxury-realestate-meets-dirty-money/.
7
See id.
8
See id.
9
See id.
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questions.”10 This “anything goes” culture in Miami’s real estate market
makes Miami a perfect place to launder money.11 So, it is no surprise that
money launderers have reared their ugly heads once again.
In April 2016, Miami Herald coverage of the “Panama Papers,” a leak
of thousands of documents from the secretive Panamanian law firm
Mossack Fonseca, revealed that criminals, including corrupt foreign
government officials, were purchasing luxury real estate in Miami through
shell corporations to launder their ill–gotten money.12 The “Panama
Papers” seem to be the missing piece in the puzzle allowing law
enforcement to see the whole picture and understand exactly how
criminals have been laundering their money undetected through Miami’s
real estate.13
Another catalyst for the federal government to take action was a case
in September 2014 involving a Spanish drug lord who used companies to
purchase thirteen Miami condos to launder money from his lucrative
cocaine–smuggling business.14 This case shined a spotlight on Miami’s
money laundering problem and exposed it to the world.15 In January 2016,
following that case and the Panama Papers leak, the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—a bureau of the U.S. Department of the
Treasury tasked with safeguarding the financial system from illicit use,
combating money laundering, and promoting national security—issued a
Geographic Targeting Order (GTO) to crackdown on money laundering in
Miami.16
The GTO requires title insurance companies to report the identity of
the beneficial owners—individuals who, directly or indirectly, own 25%
or more of the equity interests of a company17—of shell companies that
purchase real estate with cash.18 “In Miami–Dade [County], the rule
applies to homes sold for $1 million or more.”19 The government sees the
GTO as a start to a potentially larger crackdown on money laundering and
10

Id.
See id. (asserting that Miami appeals to money launderers because “banks and real
estate developers have frequently played fast and loose with the rules”).
12
See Nehamas, supra note 1.
13
See generally id. (describing how Mossack Fonseca structured real estate purchase
deals in a manner that shielded their clients’ money laundering from the government).
14
See id.
15
See id.
16
See Nicholas Nehamas, Feds crack down on secret real estate deals in Miami–Dade
and New York, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 13, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/
news/business/real-estate-news/article54450795.html.
17
Jamal El–Hindi, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, Geographic Targeting Order (July 27,
2016), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Title_Ins_GTO_Sample_072716.
pdf [hereinafter GTO].
18
See Nehamas, supra note 1.
19
See id.
11
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a means to collect information on people who may be money laundering.20
However, many professionals in the South Florida real estate industry fear
that the GTO could have a “chilling effect on the luxury [real estate]
market.”21 The issuance of the GTO and the public’s concerns raise
important questions about the GTO’s impact on Miami’s real estate
industry.
This comment seeks to answer whether the GTO will be an effective
anti–money laundering (AML) tactic and whether the GTO will negatively
impact Miami’s real estate market through analysis of the GTO itself and
the circumstances that led to the issuance of the GTO. Part II illustrates
why AML policy is necessary in Miami by detailing the events that caused
FinCEN’s issuance of the GTO, including a depiction of Miami’s history
of money laundering in the “Cocaine Cowboys” era and a portrayal of
Miami’s current money laundering problem. Part III thoroughly explains
the GTO itself by defining what a GTO is, what it is used for, and what it
requires. Part IV identifies and explains the significance of various issues
inherent in the GTO and offers suggestions to remedy them. Part V
explains the GTO’s effects on the real estate industry and argues that the
GTO will neither prevent money laundering, nor have any significant
negative impact on Miami’s real estate market, because the GTO’s many
issues render it ineffective as an AML tool and mitigate its potential
negative effects on the real estate market. Part VI synthesizes the analysis
of the GTO and its impact on Miami’s real estate industry.

II. WHY AML POLICY IS NEEDED—BISCAYNE’S WONDROUS SHORE
IS AWASH WITH FUNNY MONEY
The question presented by the section—why anti–money laundering
policy is needed in Miami—seemingly has a simple answer: Miami is
awash in a sea of ill–gotten money that is fueling a boom in real estate
development reminiscent of the “Cocaine Cowboys” era.22 But, explaining
why this explosion in money laundering is occurring is a more
complicated, yet necessary, endeavor. Solving the money laundering
problem requires an understanding of the cause of the problem, not just
the problem itself.

20
21
22

See id.
Nehamas, supra note 16.
See Nehamas, supra note 1.
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A. The Issue: Use of Shell Companies to Launder Money Through
Miami Real Estate
The Department of the Treasury issued the GTO to combat criminals’
use of shell companies to buy real estate and launder their illegally
obtained profits. Money laundering “refers to financial transactions in
which criminals, including terrorist organizations, attempt to disguise the
proceeds, sources or nature of their illicit activities.”23 Money laundering
is a serious concern because it “facilitates a broad range of serious
underlying criminal offenses and ultimately threatens the integrity of the
financial system.”24 Complicating this momentous issue further is
criminals’ use of shell companies to launder money through real estate
undetected.25 Shell companies are legal entities, such as Limited Liability
Companies, that do not conduct business of their own but are often used
to conduct illegal activities like money laundering or tax evasion.26 Of
course, however, not all legal entities involved in real estate transactions
are nefarious.

B. Benefits of Common Legal Entities in Real Estate Transactions
Legal entities are commonly used in real estate purchases and have a
wide range of benefits and protections. One of the most preferred legal
entities used in real estate transactions is a Limited Liability Company
(“LLC”).27 An LLC “is a hybrid business entity” that “has some features
of corporations and some features of partnerships, offering all of its
members limited liability as if they were shareholders of a corporation but
treating the entity and its members as a partnership for tax purposes.”28 Put
simply, an LLC “is a form of legal entity that has the attributes of both a
corporation and a partnership but is not formally characterized as either
one.”29 Another legal entity commonly used in real estate transactions is
the Business Trust, which is defined as an “unincorporated business
organization created by an instrument by which property is to be held and
managed by trustees for the benefit and profit of such persons as may be
23

Money Laundering, Resource Center, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Pages/Money-Laundering.aspx.
24
Id.
25
See Nehamas, supra note 1 (“In Miami, secretive buyers often purchase expensive
homes using opaque legal entities such as offshore companies . . . . [T]he secrecy that
surrounds those companies makes it easy and tempting to break the law.”).
26
See Nehamas, supra note 16.
27
Jeff Weaver, Forming an LLC for Real Estate Investments: Pros & Cons,
https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/forming-an-llc-for-real-estateLEGALZOOM,
investments-pros-cons.
28
51 AM. JUR. 2D Limited Liability Companies § 1, Westlaw (database updated 2017).
29
Id.
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or may become the holders of transferable certificates evidencing the
beneficial interests in the trust estate.”30 A final commonly used legal
structure in real estate is the Limited Partnership, which
is a type of partnership composed of one or more general
partners, who manage the business and are personally
liable for the partnership’s debts, and one or more limited
partners, who contribute capital and share in the profits
but take no part in running the business and incur no
liability with respect to partnership obligations beyond
their contribution.31
These legal entities have various benefits and protections inherent in
their construction that makes them attractive vehicles for real estate
purchases. For most people, the primary benefit of holding real estate
through one of the above legal entities is anonymity. The identities of
people who purchase real estate through legal entities are not public
record, only the names of the legal entities holding the properties are.32
This is an important benefit for people in the public eye, such as “[a]ctors
and athletes and politicians who don’t want the whole world potentially
camping out on their front step.”33 Anonymity is particularly important in
Miami because of the high volume of foreign nationals who own real
estate in the city.34 “You see a lot of safety concerns with people from
Brazil or Argentina,” said Alan Lips, an accountant at Gerson Preston.35
“They don’t want people from their home country to go and look on the
Internet and see that they paid a lot of money for a house and become a
target for kidnapping.”36 Consequently, for many in Miami, anonymity is
not just a benefit of using legal entities to purchase real estate, it is a matter
of life or death.
Another reason people use legal entities for real estate holdings is tax
benefits. First and foremost, many legal entities are pass–through entities,
which means that the businesses themselves do not get taxed, but the
profits and losses of the businesses are “passed through” to the owners of
30

13 AM. JUR. 2D Business Trusts § 1, Westlaw (database updated 2017).
8B FLA. JUR. 2D Business Relationships § 729, Westlaw (database updated Aug.
2017).
32
Steve Reilly & Nick Penzenstadler, 7 Reasons Property Buyers Use LLCs, From Legit
to Not, USA TODAY (Jun. 13, 2017, 4:38 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/2017/06/13/7-reasons-property-buyers-use-llcs-legit-not/102387054/.
33
Nehamas, supra note 16.
34
See Nehamas, supra note 1 (“Foreign buyers made a quarter of Miami–Dade County’s
home purchases in 2015.”).
35
Id.
36
Id.
31

166

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:159

the business, who include their respective shares of the income on their
individual tax returns.37 Considering the high volume of foreign nationals
that own property in Miami, a significant benefit of holding real estate
through legal entities is an estate tax loophole for foreigners.38 “Foreign
buyers in particular are rarely advised to list their real names on deeds to
protect against FIRPTA, an act by the IRS that subjects foreign investors
to taxation for their U.S. real estate purchases,” said attorney Scott Marcus
of Becker & Poliakoff.39 Accordingly, the primary reason most foreign
real estate purchasers use legal entities to purchase real estate is to
completely shield themselves from certain taxes.

C. Using Legal Entities in Real Estate Transactions Makes Money
Laundering Easier
The widespread use of legal entities in real estate deals lets criminals
launder money undetected through Miami real estate and creates a need
for federal action against money laundering. The same benefits and
protections that legal entities grant legitimate real estate purchasers shield
criminals from federal law, allowing “people who utilize illegal funds” to
“live a luxurious, unbelievable lifestyle.”40 Criminals use legal entities
when purchasing real estate primarily because of the anonymity that legal
entities grant all real estate purchasers. “The ownership privacy
protections of LLC’s have made it more difficult to verify ownership,”
said Michael McDonald, an international money laundering consultant
and former IRS criminal investigator.41 “Organized criminal groups often
use LLCs to buy real estate and conceal their identities because most states
don’t require LLCs to list beneficial owners or changes in ownership.”42
These protections granted by laws and legal entities allow criminals to
form companies and “bury” themselves so no one, especially the
government, knows who they are.43 This creates an especially difficult
challenge for investigators tasked with uncovering money laundering
schemes. The legal protections of entities like LLCs that cloak criminals
37

See Partnerships, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/
businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/partnerships.
38
See Nehamas, supra note 16.
39
Sean Stewart–Muniz, Government Tracking of Secret Miami Buyers Begins Tuesday,
THE REAL DEAL (Feb. 29, 2016, 2:15 PM), http://therealdeal.com/miami/2016/02/29/
government-tracking-of-secret-miami-buyers-begins-tomorrow/.
40
Jay Weaver, Spaniard López Tardón Sent to Prison for 150 Years in Miami Money–
Laundering Case, MIAMI HERALD (Sep. 29, 2014, 1:19 PM), http://www.miamiherald.
com/news/local/crime/article2296479.html.
41
See Bandell, supra note 2.
42
Id.
43
See id.
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with invisibility evinces why the Department of the Treasury needed to
issue the GTO—money laundering was too easy for criminals, and
detection was too hard for investigators.

D. Why Real Estate is a Common Vehicle for Money Laundering
Real estate is such a common vehicle for money laundering because
there is no effective regulation of real estate transactions that deters or
makes money laundering difficult. The real estate industry as a whole is
more lightly regulated than financial institutions, which have strict anti–
money laundering regulations.44 For example, “banks are required to file
a Suspicious Activities Report (SAR) with the Treasury Department if
they suspect a client is depositing or transferring corrupt money.”45
Conveniently, real estate agents and title insurers have no such
requirement.46 Further, “there’s much less regulation for putting cash into
real estate transactions than for opening a deposit or securities account.”47
This lack of regulation makes real estate a particularly attractive way for
criminals to launder their dirty money.48
“The regulation of real estate transactions for financial crime and
money laundering is worse than Swiss cheese for all the holes it’s got,”
said Charles Intriago, former assistant U.S. attorney and president of the
Miami–based Association of Certified Financial Crime Specialists, which
trains professionals to spot money laundering.49 Intriago’s scathing
assessment of real estate regulation illustrates why money laundering
through real estate is quite common—there is nothing deterring criminals.
“You have criminal groups outside the U.S. trying to park money here.
One of the best ways to do it is to buy real estate because no one asks who
you are.”50 However, this is precisely what the government has begun to
do.

E. History of Money Laundering in Miami: The Cocaine Cowboys’
Effect on Miami Real Estate
Miami has a long history of money laundering dating back to the late
1970’s when “Latin American drug lords turned Miami into a key hub of
their operations.”51 The drug lords, now commonly known as the Cocaine
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

See Silverstein, supra note 6.
Id.
See id.
Bandell, supra note 2.
See Silverstein, supra note 6.
Bandell, supra note 2.
Id.
Silverstein, supra note 6.
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Cowboys, “poured billions of dollars into the local economy, with much
of it laundered into real estate.”52 During the “Cocaine Cowboys” era of
the late 1970’s to the 1980’s, “[d]rug money tainted everything from law
enforcement to real estate to banking.”53
Looking back on Miami’s history can explain why the city is
experiencing a money laundering crisis today. The city’s “banking and real
estate industries grew up during the cocaine era.”54 The attitude in Miami
has always been “to make a quick deal and don’t ask any questions.”55
That is the culture of the Miami real estate industry in a nutshell.56 This
“fast money” culture combined with an influx of billions of dollars of drug
money developed Miami’s real estate industry into one of the nation’s
strongest.57 In fact, while the U.S. was in the depths of a recession, the
infusion of drug money into Miami’s economy “provided demand for an
estimated 25,000 legitimate jobs in banking, real–estate construction, and
the service industries.”58 Proceeds from the drug trade caused a sharp
increase in sales tax receipts for Dade County, giving the county $400
million extra per year.59 Further, Miami’s Federal Reserve branch had a
“currency surplus of $5 billion, mostly in drug–generated $50 and $100
bills,” which was more than the nation’s twelve Federal Reserve banks
combined.60
The abundance of drug money funneled through Miami real estate
caused a development boom similar to the explosion in development that
is being seen now.61 Ten thousand building permits were issued and more
than twenty skyscrapers were erected at a time when national construction
was at a standstill.62 ‘“Cocaine was the currency that built that skyline,”‘
said Alex Daoud, Mayor of Miami Beach during the “Cocaine Cowboys”
era, while he looked at the dense clusters of mainland high–rises across
Biscayne Bay.63 One veteran real estate broker said that “it was one of the
busiest times ever” in Miami.64 “At a time when national interest rates
52

Id.
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
See Gerald Posner, Cocaine Cowboys, THE DAILY BEAST (Oct. 12, 2009),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2009/10/12/cocaine-cowboys.html (explaining that
the abundance of money from the drug trade helped fuel real estate development in a time
where “national interest rates were high and real estate was in a tailspin”).
58
Id.
59
See id.
60
Silverstein, supra note 6.
61
See Posner, supra note 57.
62
See id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
53
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were high and real estate was in a tailspin, South Florida was the only
market where housing prices boomed.”65 Adding even more suspicion to
an already curious real estate boom, “[a]bout one–third of all property
transactions were all cash,” at the time.66 To many outsiders, the growth
in Miami’s real estate industry might seem unexplainable, but the locals
here knew that “[d]rug profits were clearly pumping up the price of
property.”67 Adding to the money laundering crisis, the illicit money that
drove up property values in Miami was “routed in different ways: through
law firms, offshore corporations, and banks,” which made tracking the
sources of funds a difficult task for law enforcement agencies.68
History has seemingly repeated itself because law enforcement
agencies today are experiencing precisely the same problem of tracking
sources of funds in real estate transactions.69 It is no surprise that a money
laundering problem like this could resurface in Miami because the City’s
real estate and banking industries evolved during the “Cocaine Cowboys”
era and in the process developed an attitude of making quick deals without
asking any questions.70 A laissez–faire attitude such as this, unchecked,
could easily lead to a money laundering crisis, as evidenced by the rampant
money laundering experienced in the “Cocaine Cowboys” era.71 The
current money laundering crisis in Miami, explained further in the
following section, drove FinCEN to issue the GTO as an attempt to
identify the source of funds for certain real estate transactions and prevent
money laundering.72

F. Flooded by a Sea of “Funny Money”: Miami’s Money
Laundering Crisis
Miami is awash with “funny money” that has fueled the luxury home
market in a manner reminiscent of the “Cocaine Cowboys” era of 1980’s
Miami.73 Within the past two years, the Panama Papers and a high–profile
trial of an alleged international drug smuggler revealed that for many years
criminals have been purchasing tens of millions of dollars in luxury Miami

65

Id.
Id.
67
Rebecca Wakefield, Awash in a Sea of Money, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Oct. 6, 2005, 4:00
AM), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/awash-in-a-sea-of-money-6339208.
68
Id.
69
See Nehamas, supra note 1.
70
See Silverstein, supra note 6.
71
See generally Posner, supra note 57 (detailing the many instances of money
laundering during the “Cocaine Cowboys” era).
72
See Nehamas, supra note 1.
73
See id.
66
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real estate through shell corporations to launder their ill–gotten money.74
However, this is likely just a drop in the bucket for Miami’s market.75 The
Panama Papers is a massive trove of leaked confidential files from the
secretive Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca, which was obtained by
the Miami Herald in association with the International Consortium of
Investigative Journalists.76 A Miami Herald analysis of the leaked
documents revealed that “19 foreign nationals creat[ed] offshore
companies and [bought] Miami real estate.”77 Of the nineteen, “eight have
been linked to bribery, corruption, embezzlement, tax evasion or other
misdeeds in their home countries.”78
The Panama Papers is the key to understanding how criminals have
been laundering money through Miami real estate undetected. The Panama
Papers show that the law firm Mossack Fonseca created offshore shell
corporations for its clients in tax havens, such as Panama or the British
Virgin Islands, which do not require owners of the companies to disclose
their names.79 Those corporations would then purchase luxury real estate
in Miami with ill–gotten cash, and the U.S. government would never know
whose money actually purchased the property—until the Panama Papers
exposed the anonymous buyers.80
Mossack Fonseca’s conduct confirms what many law enforcement
officials have long thought: “[m]oney from people linked to wrongdoing
abroad is helping to power the gleaming condo towers rising on South
Florida’s waterfront and pushing home prices far beyond what most locals
can afford.”81 However, this problem is likely much larger than the
activities exposed by the Panama Papers. In fact, financial institutions in
Miami “report more suspicious activity than any other major U.S. city
besides New York City and Los Angeles, according to FinCEN data.”82
Further, 53 percent of all Miami–Dade home sales in 2015 were made with
cash—double the national average—and a whopping 90 percent of new
construction sales were made with cash, according to the Miami
Association of Realtors.83 And 2015 is no anomaly; “[i]n the first half of
2013, 73 percent of condo resales by dollar volume were cash deals,
according to the Miami Association of Realtors.”84
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See Nehamas, supra note 1.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Bandell, supra note 2.
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Much of the cash flooding the Miami real estate market is flowing
from international buyers.85 In 2012, nearly 90 percent of condo buyers
were foreign and that trend has continued in recent years.86 Additionally,
“[f]oreign nationals bought nearly $6.1 billion worth of homes in Miami–
Dade, Broward and Palm Beach counties [in 2015], more than a third of
all local home spending, according to the Miami Association of
Realtors.”87 And 25 percent of all home purchases in Miami are made by
foreign buyers.88 “City boosters touted the foreign investment as a sign
that Miami had arrived on the world stage.”89 However, the influx of
foreign money “sent home prices soaring beyond the reach” of many
families.90 “Locals trying to buy homes with mortgages can’t compete
with foreign buyers flush with cash and willing to pay the list price or
more.”91
Linked to the abnormally large amount of purchases in cash and
purchases by foreign nationals is the tremendous rise in real estate
development immediately after the nation’s worst housing crash in its
history.92 In 2013, Peter Zalewski, a principal with Bal Harbour–based
Condo Vultures LLC, commented that he was “astounded that, only two
years after the first post–recession condo broke ground in South Florida,
there are 152 towers planned, including 70 taking deposits and 32 under
construction.”93 “That’s one hell of a pace,” Zalewski said.94 Of course,
not all of the new housing stock will be used for money laundering. Jack
McCabe, an analyst who studies the Miami housing market, said, “it’s
impossible to know how many homes are purchased with dirty money.”95
However, “many people believe it could be a sizable portion of the new
condominium market in Miami.”96
Real estate developers also could be a part of the problem of illegal
money driving the Miami real estate market. McCabe said, “even though
developers and real–estate professionals suspect many of [their] units are
bought with illegal funds, they realize their projects may not be successful
without that support,” which proves that the laissez–faire attitude of the
“Cocaine Cowboys” era real estate industry is not only alive and well, but
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also driving the Miami real estate market boom.97 However, Miami’s
current real estate boom is quite different from its last real estate boom,
where developers asked for down payments of 10 to 20 percent. Now,
“many developers ask for upward of 60 percent down—so depositors
mostly fund buildings.”98 The requirement of such high down payments
gives developers no reason to look into the source of purchasers’ funds. In
fact, because developers demand so much money up front, “they often
aren’t checking the buyer’s source of income,” said Gary Saul, “a
Greenberg Traurig shareholder who has done legal work for condo
developers . . . .”99 “The developers don’t know who’s behind it, and I
don’t think they care,” said Charles Intriago, former assistant U.S. attorney
and president of the Miami–based Association of Certified Financial
Crime Specialists, which trains professionals to spot money laundering.100
“They want to make sales, regulations be damned.”101 This type of quick
deal–making with no questions asked caused many problems during the
“Cocaine Cowboys” era and continues to do so today. Real estate
professionals have been playing fast and loose, allowing criminals to
launder money unabated for too long, which is precisely why FinCEN
needed to issue the GTO.
While there was a definite need for government intervention, the
Miami money laundering crisis was not a sizeable blip on the federal
government’s radar until after the high–profile trial of alleged international
drug smuggler Alvaro López Tardón in September 2014.102 The alleged
Spanish drug lord owned luxury condos in Miami through legal entities
registered in his own name or the names of his associates.103 Prosecutors
argued that he was the leader of a violent drug ring, Los Miami, and that
he was laundering the profits from his cocaine–smuggling business
through his Miami condos.104 López Tardón was found guilty of money
laundering for purchasing luxury cars and real estate with $20 million of
ill–gotten profits from his drug smuggling operation.105 After his
conviction, federal agents seized his illegally obtained assets, “including a
fleet of luxury cars and 13 condos.”106 In late September 2014, when
97
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López Tardón was sentenced to 150 years in federal prison for money
laundering, U.S. District Court Judge Joan Lenard had this to say about
López Tardón’s $20 million dollar shopping spree: “I call it funny money,
and we have a plethora of funny money here . . . . Miami is replete with
people who utilize illegal funds and live a luxurious, unbelievable
lifestyle.”107 Judge Lenard’s scathing declaration shined a spotlight on
Miami’s money laundering issue, pressuring the federal government to
take action. The government eventually took action by issuing the GTO in
January 2016.108 Miami condo market analyst, Peter Zalewski, commented
that “López Tardón’s case prompted the feds to take a hard look at Miami
real estate.”109 “Locally, people have been talking about illicit money
propping up the condo market since the 1980s,” Zalewski said about
Miami’s money laundering problem; but “[t]he government usually needs
a catalyst like this before it can act.”110
The López Tardón case provided the stimulus the government needed
to take action, but the totality of the circumstances demanded that swift
action was necessary. As outlined above, for many years, criminals have
been using shell companies to launder money through Miami real estate,111
all cash purchases of Miami real estate have been exceedingly high,112 and
the Miami real estate market has boomed just after the worst housing crash
in U.S. history.113 These circumstances and the López Tardón case
increased pressure on the federal government to crackdown on money
laundering in Miami. Such a high–profile case involving tens of millions
in drug profits flowing through the Miami real estate market could have
reasonably made federal agents believe that Miami was in the midst of a
“Cocaine Cowboys 2.0” money laundering crisis. To stem the tide of
illegal money from flooding the Miami real estate market any further, the
government needed to implement anti–money laundering policy in Miami.
That is exactly what it did by issuing the GTO.

III. THE GTO: THE GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPTED CRACKDOWN ON
MONEY LAUNDERING IN MIAMI
In January 2016, after years of rampant money laundering and
suspicious activities in the Miami real estate market, the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—a bureau of the U.S. Department of the
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Weaver, supra note 105.
See Nehamas, supra note 16.
Nehamas, supra note 1.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See Bandell, supra note 2.

174

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:159

Treasury tasked with safeguarding the financial system from illicit use,
combating money laundering, and promoting national security—issued a
Geographic Targeting Order (GTO) in Miami–Dade County.114 A
Geographic Targeting Order is an “order that imposes certain additional
recordkeeping and reporting requirements on one or more domestic
financial institutions or nonfinancial trades or businesses in a geographic
area.”115 A GTO derives its authority to impose these requirements from
the following sources of law: 31 U.S.C. § 5326(a), 31 CFR § 1010.370,
and Treasury Order 180–01.116 In general, a GTO requires domestic
financial institutions or nonfinancial trades or businesses
to obtain such information as the Secretary [of the
Treasury] may describe . . . concerning—(A) any
transaction in which such [business] is involved for the
payment, receipt, or transfer of United States coins or
currency . . . the total amounts or denominations of which
are equal to or greater than an amount which the Secretary
may prescribe; and (B) any other person participating in
such transaction.117
Additionally, a GTO requires businesses to “maintain a record of such
information for such period of time as the Secretary [of the Treasury] may
require” and “file a report with respect to any transaction described in
paragraph (1)(A) in the manner and to the extent specified in the order.”118
The U.S. Treasury Department was concerned with money laundering
through Miami real estate, so it issued a GTO to track the transactions most
vulnerable to manipulation: legal entities buying residential real property
for at least $1 million using cash.119 The purpose of the GTO is to prevent
money laundering by collecting information about the identities of
potential money launderers.120 The issuance of the GTO represents the
Department of the Treasury’s “ceremonial first pitch” of its potentially
larger crackdown on money laundering through real estate.121
The January 2016 GTO was effective from March 1, 2016 to August
27, 2016. During that time, FinCEN said that the GTO generated “useful
data” that is “helping law enforcement identify possible illicit activity and
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informing future regulatory approaches.”122 Because the GTO has proven
to be helpful, FinCEN extended the reach of the GTO to Broward and
Palm Beach Counties, among others, on July 27, 2016.123 The information
obtained from the initial GTOs “suggests that we are on the right track,”
said Jamal El–Hindi, Acting Director of FinCEN.124 “By expanding the
GTOs to other major cities, we will learn even more about the money
laundering risks in the national real estate markets, helping us determine
our future regulatory course.”125
The GTOs issued to title insurance companies initially generated
useful information because they required covered businesses involved in
covered transactions to report such transactions to FinCEN within 30
days.126 A covered business under the GTO is a “title insurance company
and any of its subsidiaries or agents.”127 A covered transaction under the
GTO is a transaction made by (1) a legal entity, (2) which purchases
residential real property for a total purchase price of $1,000,000 or more
in Miami–Dade County, and (3) the purchase is made, at least in part,
using currency or a cashier’s check, a certified check, a traveler’s check, a
personal check, a business check, or a money order in any form, (4)
without a bank loan or other external financing.128 For the purpose of
covered transactions, the GTO defines a legal entity as “a corporation,
limited liability company, partnership or other similar business entity,
whether formed under the laws of a state or of the United States or a
foreign jurisdiction.”129
The GTO imposes strict reporting requirements on title insurance
companies involved in transactions where a legal entity purchases
residential real estate in Miami–Dade County for $1 million or more in
cash.130 Specifically, the GTO requires that title insurers file a form 8300,
which FinCEN provides, within 30 days of the transaction.131 The form
8300 must contain (1) information about the identity of the individual
primarily responsible for representing the purchaser, (2) information about
the identity of the purchaser, (3) information about the identity of the
122
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beneficial owner(s) of the purchaser, (4) information about the covered
transaction, and (5) information about the title insurance company.132
According to the GTO the following must be included in the information
about the covered transaction: the date of closing of the covered
transaction, the total amount transferred in the form of payment, the total
purchase price of the covered transaction, and the address of real property
involved in the covered transaction.133
The terms of the GTO are strict and must be followed by title insurers
because they carry serious civil and criminal penalties.134 The GTO
provides that the “Covered Business and any of its officers, directors,
employees, and agents may be liable, without limitation, for civil or
criminal penalties for violating any of the terms of this Order.”135 The
“without limitation” language suggests that civil and criminal penalties
will be pursued to the full extent of the law in the event that a company
violates the terms of the order. Accordingly, title insurers must pay careful
attention to the GTO’s requirements when reporting information to
FinCEN to avoid potential civil and criminal liability. However, this task
proves harder than it seems due to the many issues and ambiguities
inherent in the GTO, which will be analyzed further in the following
section.

IV. POTENTIAL ISSUES ARISING OUT OF THE GTO
The GTO on its face seems like a good starting point in the Federal
Government’s battle against money laundering. However, the GTO is not
without issues, some of which could render the GTO ineffective or more
troublesome than it is worth. Similar to the regulation of real estate
transactions for financial crime and money laundering, the GTO “is worse
than Swiss cheese for all the holes it’s got.”136 Also, the GTO is riddled
with ambiguities that make it problematic and expensive to comply with.
The GTO provides no guidance on many of the difficult situations title
insurers will inevitably find themselves in while attempting to comply
with the GTO. If the issues explained in this section are not addressed, the
GTO will be a worthless weapon in the fight against money laundering.
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A. Loophole: Title Insurance is not Required Under Florida Law
The GTO requires only title insurers, their subsidiaries, and their
agents to report information about covered transactions to FinCEN.137
However, title insurance is not required under Florida law.138 This
loophole is probably the easiest way for someone to circumvent the
reporting requirements of the GTO, though it is risky because the
purchaser would be gambling that no future title dispute will arise. Title
insurance is a protection policy against loss if any defect of title to property
results in a claim against ownership.139
If a claim is made against your property, title insurance
will . . . assure you of a legal defense and pay all court
costs and related fees. Also, if the claim proves valid, you
will be reimbursed for your actual loss up to the face
amount of the policy.140
However, in certain situations—like when purchasing new
construction—title insurance may not be necessary; thus, many of the
transactions the GTO aims to track are not covered by the GTO because
title insurers will not be involved. When buying new construction, “the
chance of a future title challenge appears low, thus further dimming the
perceived need for purchasing insurance.”141 Purchasers can also obtain a
“title search without buying any insurance to confirm there are no liens on
the property,” which would lower a buyer’s risk of loss and need for title
insurance.142 New construction sales, the type of transactions with the least
perceived need for title insurance, seemingly have the most suspicion of
money laundering surrounding them, evidenced by law enforcement
officials belief that illegal money is “helping to power the gleaming condo
towers rising on South Florida’s waterfront.”143 Further, cash deals
accounted for 90 percent of Miami’s new construction sales in 2015.144
That exceedingly high rate of cash purchases of new construction supports
the notion that there is rampant money laundering in new construction
137
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sales. Because the vast majority of new construction sales are made in cash
and there is no major need for title insurance in these transactions show
that the GTO will not cover many of the transactions it was designed to
track.

B. Loophole: The All–Cash Purchase Requirement is Easily
Circumvented
A transaction is subject to the GTO only if it was an all–cash
purchase—transactions made “at least in part, using currency or a cashier’s
check, a certified check, a traveler’s check, a personal check, a business
check, or a money order in any form.”145 The GTO does not cover
purchases without a bank loan or other external financing, including
electronic fund transfers (EFTs, or wire transfers).146 Therefore, if a shell
corporation purchases a property using a wire transfer, the transaction
would not be covered under the GTO and a purchaser could avoid having
their identity reported to FinCEN. However, “banks already collect
information about the originator and recipient of EFTs and make that
information available to regulators upon request,” which could explain
why FinCEN did not cover EFTs in the GTO.147 Further, FinCEN likely
wanted to start small and “could have been uncomfortable stretching its
authority to cover wire transfers,” said Theresa Van Vliet, a former federal
prosecutor in the Southern District of Florida.148 “This is a strategic move,”
said Van Vliet, who believes it was smart for FinCEN “to start small.”149
While it may have been a smart strategic move for FinCEN to start
small and not extend its power to cover wire transfers, “by not monitoring
those financial instruments, investigators will miss out on most sales of
new condos,” said Alan Lips, a Miami accountant.150 With the expansion
of technology, it makes sense that buyers paying cash to purchase real
estate would increasingly use wire transfers to pay for the property. This
fact combined with the fact that wire transfers are not covered by the GTO
creates a potentially large loophole that is so simple almost anyone could
take advantage of it.
Additionally, people could hide their identities from bank regulators
monitoring EFTs by using a network of LLCs to make a real estate
purchase, which puts the federal government in a weak position to fight
145
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money laundering. Remember, FinCEN likely did not extend its power to
cover wire transfers under the GTO because “banks already collect
information about the originator and recipient of EFTs.”151 Because people
could also hide their identities from bank regulators, the loophole is likely
more significant than FinCEN would have thought when it decided not to
cover EFTs in the GTO. To avoid having their identities disclosed to
federal regulators under wire transfer regulations, people could structure
the transaction using a network of LLCs. For example, someone using a
wire transfer to purchase a property in Miami could have the funds
transferred to the seller from a Florida LLC, owned by an LLC formed in
the British Virgin Islands, which does not require owners to disclose their
identities to form an LLC.152 Consequently, the identity of the purchaser
could not be discovered.
Because of the simplicity of avoiding federal regulations, the loophole
created by not including EFTs in the GTO is potentially much more
substantial than FinCEN may have realized. If FinCEN wants to improve
its position in the fight against money laundering, it should expand the
GTO to include EFTs, as a FinCEN spokesperson said it would if “it
becomes apparent buyers are using [wire] transfers to skirt regulations.”153
Though, to be fair, anyone tasked with finding information about the
identity of a purchaser in the situation described above would be hard
pressed to find anything, which raises important questions about what title
insurers should do when they face a similar situation. That issue is
analyzed further later in this section.

C. Loophole: Trusts are not Subject to the GTO’s Requirements
The GTO does not cover trusts.154 Accordingly, beneficiaries of trusts
would not have their identities disclosed if the trusts purchased residential
real property for $1 million or more in cash, creating a loophole for money
launderers and anyone else who may want their identity concealed from
federal regulators.155 The GTO only covers transactions in which the buyer
of residential real property is a legal entity.156 Under the GTO, “Legal
Entity means a corporation, limited liability company, partnership or other
similar business entity, whether formed under the laws of a state or of the
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United States or a foreign jurisdiction.”157 Noticeably absent from this
definition are trusts. This drafting exclusion creates a loophole that people
can take advantage of to circumvent the GTO, thus making the GTO less
effective in combating money laundering.158 FinCEN should include trusts
in the GTO’s definition of “Legal Entity” to fill in this gaping hole in the
GTO.

D. The GTO Does Not Define “Residential Real Property”
A transaction is a “covered transaction” under the GTO if the
transaction is for the purchase of “residential real property.”159 However,
the GTO never defines “residential real property.” The lack of a definition
creates an ambiguity in the GTO and makes classifying a transaction as
“covered” a difficult task for title insurers. This is a problematic situation
for title insurers because violating the terms of the GTO can result in civil
or criminal liability, without limitation.160
On February 1, 2016, after the American Land Title Association wrote
a letter raising various concerns with the GTO,161 FinCEN issued guidance
on the question of what “residential real property” is.162 Unfortunately, its
answer was not sufficiently precise to clarify the ambiguity.163 According
to FinCEN guidance, “‘residential real property’ means real property
(including individual units of condominiums and cooperatives) designed
principally for the occupancy of from one to four families.”164 This
definition provides some guidance, but it still does not clarify whether
entire apartment complexes or condominiums are considered “residential
real property.” In general, these types of property are “considered
commercial real estate, albeit residential in nature.”165 However,
FinCEN’s definition includes individual units of condominiums, but does
that mean that entire condominium buildings are excluded?166 The
definition also includes property “designed principally for the occupancy
of from one to four families,” but would a four–unit condominium be
included in this definition?167 Technically, such a property is designed for
157
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the occupancy of four families, but, for an owner, the purpose of this type
of property likely would be commercial in nature.168 Further, FinCEN’s
definition neglects to mention how a commercial aspect of a property
would affect its classification.169 Assuming a four–unit condo is
considered “residential real property,” how would the presence of offices
or retail shops in the building affect its classification?170 Under FinCEN’s
guidance, it is still unclear whether the above described properties would
be considered “residential real property.” This ambiguity can cause
significant problems for title insurers that face civil and criminal penalties
if they violate the terms of the GTO.

E. Can Title Insurers Bear the Additional Costs of Complying With
the GTO?
Complying with the GTO will surely impose additional costs on title
insurers, but “are title insurance companies equipped to perform the AML
functions set forth in the GTOs?”171 Kevin L. Shepherd, “chair of the
American Bar Association Real Property, Trust & Estate Law Section’s
Working Group on Anti–Money Laundering/Counter–Terrorist Financing
Efforts Affecting Lawyers,”172 and others in the legal community have
identified this issue and raised questions about its effect.173 “Banks and
financial institutions are accustomed to implementing and maintaining
sophisticated AML procedures and protocols, but it remains to be seen
whether the title insurance industry will be able to do so—at least in the
short term.”174 Finding the required information about the parties in the
transactions, reporting this information, training employees, and extra
time spent on due diligence will all impose significant costs on title
insurers. It is unclear what costs the title insurers will bear and what costs,
if any, will be passed on to the consumer.175 It is clear, however, that
complying with the requirements of the GTO will impose substantial costs
on those involved in covered transactions.
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F. The GTO Provides No Guidance on Compliance or the
Consequences of Noncompliance
The GTO provides no guidance on what efforts title insurers should
use to ensure compliance with the GTO or the consequences of
noncompliance with the GTO. The Order merely says that noncompliance
subjects title insurers to criminal and civil liability.176 What happens if a
title insurer is involved in a transaction where compliance is impossible,
such as when the beneficial owner’s identity cannot be discovered? Should
title insurers not participate in these types of transactions? The answer to
that question is unclear. On one hand, transactions with anonymous
purchasers are not inherently suspicious as anonymity is a real concern for
many purchasers.177 The Panama Papers leaks show that even confidential
documents are at risk for public exposure, which would put purchasers’
anonymity at risk. So, it is not accurate for a title insurer to categorize all
transactions with anonymous purchasers as suspicious, and thus avoid
them. On the other hand, noncompliance with the GTO when involved in
covered transactions subjects insurers to serious liability.178 To be safe,
title insurers must weigh these risks and try to identify the required
information under the GTO before issuing insurance.
The GTO also gives no guidance on how title insurers should comply
with the order. This raises an important question: do title insurers have an
obligation to find beneficial owners before issuing a policy, or do they
need only to use best efforts to find and report the information? Luckily,
FinCen has provided some guidance on this.179 Stephen Hudak, the Public
Affairs chief for FinCEN, said “we don’t expect [title insurance
companies] to do investigations, we ask that they make the inquiries and
report the information provided.”180 “Even if they are lied to by the buyer,
that information could be useful to law enforcement.”181 Hudak’s
statement is helpful, but it does not address what the title insurer should
do if no information about the identity of the purchaser is discovered.
Should a title insurer leave that part of the Form 8300 blank, or should it
remove itself from the transaction? Would leaving a part of the Form 8300
blank be considered noncompliance? It seems prudent to avoid such a
transaction, as noncompliance carries potential civil and criminal
punishment, but the obligations of the title insurer involved in such a
transaction still remain unclear.
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The various issues identified and explained in this section will
considerably affect the usefulness of the GTO as an AML tactic and those
forced to comply with the GTO. The many loopholes in the GTO may
eventually make it an ineffective weapon in the government’s fight against
money laundering. The ambiguities in the GTO and the other problems
stemming from the GTO may ultimately make it more troublesome than it
is worth. FinCEN must address these issues to ensure that title insurers
comply with the GTO.

V. EFFECTS OF THE GTO—MIAMI REAL ESTATE WILL CONTINUE
TO FLOAT ON A SEA OF ILLEGAL CASH
The many loopholes and issues inherent in the GTO or resulting from
the GTO will have various effects on the Miami real estate industry, but
these loopholes in the GTO will render it ineffective as a means to prevent
money laundering and will prevent the GTO from negatively impacting
the Miami real estate market—as many feared it would.182 While the GTO
may be successful in gathering some information helpful to law
enforcement agencies,183 it probably will not deter criminals from
laundering their ill–gotten profits through Miami real estate. The
numerous loopholes in the GTO, as explained in Section IV, provide too
many avenues for money launderers to circumvent the reporting
requirements of the GTO. For instance, someone could make a purchase
from a trust instead of a covered legal entity, use a wire transfer instead of
cash to make a purchase, or elect not to purchase title insurance to
completely avoid having their identity reported to FinCEN under the
GTO.184 Though these loopholes may stop the GTO from preventing
money laundering in Miami, they will likely affect how people choose to
structure certain real estate transactions.
An increased use of trusts and wire transfers in all–cash real estate
transactions of $1 million or more should be expected as a result of the
loopholes in the GTO. The GTO requires information about a legal entity
to be reported to FinCEN when it buys real estate in an all–cash purchase
for more than $1 million in Miami, but wire transfers are not covered
transactions under the GTO and the GTO’s definition of legal entity does
182
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not include trusts.185 These gaps in the GTO’s coverage provide ways for
people to avoid having their identities reported to FinCEN. Thus, people
that wish to remain truly anonymous in a real estate transaction, for
legitimate or illegitimate reasons, are now likely to use one of these
avenues to maintain their anonymity when involved in a transaction that
would otherwise be covered by the GTO.
Further, the limited coverage of the GTO could cause an increase in
money laundering through commercial properties in Miami, as these are
not covered by the GTO. The GTO covers purchases of “residential real
property,”186 which FinCEN has defined as “real property (including
individual units of condominiums and cooperatives) designed principally
for the occupancy of from one to four families.”187 Most commercial real
estate would not be covered by this definition of “residential real property”
because seemingly only one– to four–unit apartment complexes or
condominiums could fall into this definition.188 Because commercial
properties are not covered by the GTO, criminals may seek to launder
money through commercial real estate, which would protect their
anonymity from the reporting requirements of the GTO, potentially
shielding them from law enforcement.189 If money laundering through
commercial real estate grows significantly, then commercial real estate
prices could be propped up by illegal money similar to what happened in
the residential market.190 Miami already has a problem with the price of
real estate being too high for most locals to afford, and propping up
commercial real estate values would further that problem.191
Commercial real estate prices likely will not be the only prices on the
rise. The GTO may also drive the cost of title insurance up in Miami. The
GTO requires title insurance companies to find and report information
about the parties involved in covered transactions.192 These
responsibilities impose substantial additional costs on the title insurers.193
Finding the required information about the parties in the transactions,
reporting this information, training employees, and the extra time spent on
due diligence will all cost title insurers money. The title insurance
companies will likely pass these additional costs down to consumers, if
possible, which would surely increase title insurance costs for covered
185
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transactions and could even increase title insurance costs for all
transactions.
The GTO and the many loopholes and issues inherent in it may affect
how certain real estate transactions are structured and some other aspects
of the real estate industry. However, it will not have a significant negative
impact on Miami’s luxury real estate or new condo markets—as many
feared it would.194 Initially, many industry professionals feared that the
GTO would scare off buyers who desire to remain anonymous in real
estate transactions.195 However, title insurance is not required for real
estate purchases. Purchasers that wish to preserve their anonymity can
choose not to purchase title insurance and completely avoid the GTO’s
reporting requirements because no title insurer would be involved in the
deal.196 Deciding against purchasing title insurance may seem risky, but
“you can get a title search without buying any insurance” to confirm there
are no clouds on the title of a property.197 Further, the risks title insurance
protects against—clouds on titles—are extremely minimal when
purchasing a new condo from the developer.198 So, purchasers don’t have
a pressing need for title insurance in many cases and have alternatives to
confirm there is no liens on the property. Thus, for purchases of new
condos, the portion of the market the GTO was feared to affect the most,199
title insurances companies are not even needed.200 Not purchasing title
insurance would exempt the transaction from the GTOs reporting
requirement, preventing any significant negative effect.201
Furthermore, even if title insurance is purchased, a substantial portion
of new condo purchases still will not be subjected to the GTO’s reporting
requirements.202 “By not monitoring [wire transfers and personal checks],
investigators will miss out on most sales of new condos, said Alan Lips, a
Miami accountant.”203 Because the GTO will not cover the majority of
new condo sales, the fears of many real estate professionals that the GTO
would have a “chilling effect” on the luxury market seemingly were an
overreaction.204 “‘I think this is really blown out of proportion,’” agreed
Carlos Rosso, president of the condo division for local mega–developer
Related Group. ‘Everything is done through the banking system for new
194
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construction.’”205 These statements from industry professionals make clear
that the GTO will not affect most real estate transactions, and thus will not
have a significant negative effect on the Miami real estate market.
The downturn currently seen in Miami’s market for new condos, and
its housing market in general, is more likely attributed to over–supply and
a strengthening dollar relative to foreign currencies.206 Currently, Miami
condo prices are declining and likely will continue to fall in the coming
months.207 “In the latest Q3 condo market statistics for the Greater
Downtown Miami and the Miami Beaches, prices declined slightly by
1.4%, and all other leading indicators are soft.”208 “In other words, the
market is likely to take a further hit,” said Sep Niakan, Owner of HB
Roswell Realty, a brokerage firm in the Edgewater neighborhood of
Miami.209 “This latest quarter’s numbers expose a year–over–year 25%
decline in condo sales volume in the Greater Downtown Miami and the
Miami Beaches, with 1,213 sales in Q3 2016 versus 1,615 sales in the
same quarter in 2015.”210 One cause of this downturn is the over–supply
of condos, as evidenced by Miami’s unprecedented pace of development
in recent years211 and its exceedingly high absorption rate—“the number
of months it would take to sell all the properties currently on the
market.”212 The absorption rate for “a balanced market in Miami is 6–12
months of inventory depending on the type and price point.”213 However,
as of October 24, 2016, the absorption rate for Miami condos was “a
whopping 24.5 months overall inventory.”214 This overabundance of
supply causes “downward pressure on prices until the inventory
dissipates.”215
The other cause of the current downturn in the Miami condo market is
the growing absence of foreign buyers due to the strengthening dollar
relative to other foreign currencies.216 Since the summer of 2014, “the U.S
dollar started to climb against most foreign currencies, which started a
205
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slow but steady decline of buyers from those continents.”217 From then
until November 2016, “the euro has lost 36% of its value, the Brazilian
real 43% and the Colombian peso 59% against the U.S. dollar.”218 This is
significant because Miami’s real estate market is driven, in part, by foreign
investment, which is now much more expensive to do because of the
strength of the dollar relative to foreign currencies.219 In fact, 25% of home
purchases in Miami and $6.1 billion worth of real estate in the tri–county
area were purchased by foreign nationals in 2015.220 So, it makes sense
that the market would take a downturn when the strong U.S. dollar, in
relation to weak foreign currencies, caused a significant diminution in
demand for real estate.
The GTO’s many issues will render it ineffective as a means of
preventing money laundering, but those issues also ensure that the GTO
will not have a “chilling effect”221 on the Miami real estate market. The
GTO’s under–inclusiveness not only indicates that money launderers have
many avenues to circumvent the GTO’s reporting requirements, but it also
signifies that the GTO will not cover many of the transactions it was feared
to have the worst effect on.222 While the GTO will have various effects on
the real estate industry, it will not have a major negative impact. The fear
of a “chilling effect”223 on the Miami real estate market was overblown
because the current downturn in the Miami market is easily explained by
the foundational laws of economics—supply and demand.224

VI. CONCLUSION
Miami is experiencing a money laundering problem that has not been
seen since drug money flooded the City’s streets during the “Cocaine
Cowboys” era of the 1980s. The money laundering crisis derives from the
laissez–faire attitude towards accepting large sums of cash that developed
in Miami during the “Cocaine Cowboys” era. The money laundering
problem has become so sizable because of the lax regulations of cash real
estate transactions, compared to other means of laundering money, and the
anonymity that legal entities can provide criminals.
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To crackdown on the money laundering crisis in Miami, the
Department of the Treasury, through the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN), issued a Geographic Targeting Order (GTO).225
Targeted specifically at the causes of the money laundering crisis—lax
regulations of cash real estate transactions and the anonymity of legal
entities—the GTO requires title insurance companies to report the identity
of the beneficial owners of shell companies that purchase real estate with
cash.226
While many professionals in the South Florida real estate industry
believe the GTO would have a “chilling effect on the luxury [real estate]
market,” the GTO, has many flaws that, if unaddressed, will prevent it
from stemming the tide of illegal money that is flooding the Miami real
estate market.227 The GTO’s under–inclusiveness provides money
launderers with too many avenues to circumvent its reporting
requirements, and the GTO’s ambiguities will cause problems for title
insurers that must comply with it.
The same issues that make the GTO ineffective in preventing money
laundering also ensure that the GTO will not have a significant negative
impact on the Miami real estate market—as many feared it would.228
Because the GTO is under–inclusive, it will not cover most of the
transactions it was feared to affect the most.229 The current downturn the
market is experiencing is not due to the GTO and is easily explained by
the laws of supply and demand.230 While the GTO will have various effects
on the real estate industry, the fear that it would have a “chilling effect”231
was overblown.

VII. GTO UPDATE
Just before this article was set to be published, FinCEN issued a
revised GTO that addresses the preceding GTO’s underinclusiveness.232
“FinCEN is revising the GTOs to capture a broader range of transactions
225
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and include transactions involving wire transfers.”233 These revisions
further my argument that a more inclusive drafting of the GTO is
necessary to FinCEN’s success in combatting money laundering. Armed
with a more powerful weapon—a revised GTO—I believe FinCEN finally
has what it needs to prevail in the fight against money laundering.
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